The Meaning of ‘Attributable to Intoxication’: Self-Defence and Mistaken Belief by Storey, Tony
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Storey, Tony (2018) The Meaning of ‘Attributable to Intoxication’: Self-Defence and Mistaken 
Belief. The Journal of Criminal Law, 82 (5). pp. 362-365. ISSN 0022-0183 
Published by: Sage
URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022018318806408 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022018318806408>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/45583/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
This  document  may differ  from the  final,  published version of  the research  and has been made 
available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version 
of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.)
                        
The meaning of “attributable to intoxication”: Self-defence and 
mistaken belief. 
 
R v Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, Court of Appeal 
 
Keywords – attempted murder, self-defence, voluntary intoxication, mistaken belief, 
necessary and reasonable force 
 
In the early afternoon of Sunday 31 January 2016, Simon Taj (T) was driving along the 
Albert Embankment in central London. He came across Mohammed Awan (M), an 
electrician, whose van had broken down. M was standing next to the vehicle which had a 
plume of smoke emanating from it. T parked alongside M’s car and asked if he could do 
anything to help. At that point M was using his phone to try to arrange a recovery vehicle but 
he asked T if he had any jump leads. At this, T became suspicious and began asking M 
questions. T then walked off, out of M’s hearing, and rang 999 to report a ‘possible bomb 
scare threat’. 
 
T returned to M’s van and asked to look inside. M allowed T to look inside where 
(unsurprisingly, given M’s occupation) T noticed electrical equipment and wires. However, T 
concluded that M was involved in terrorist activities. Responding to the 999 call, the police 
soon arrived and quickly decided that M was not a terrorist but simply an electrician whose 
vehicle had broken down. They attempted to jump-start his van but this only generated more 
smoke. They abandoned attempts to re-start the vehicle, advised M to get it towed to a 
garage, and left. T also left but, as he drove away, he continued to be troubled by what he 
had seen. 
 
He returned to the scene to find M still standing next to his van and talking on his phone. T 
formed the view that M was inquiring how to detonate a bomb. T armed himself with a tyre 
lever from his own van, approached M and began to attack him with it, striking him over the 
head, inflicting a number of serious injuries including a fractured skull and eye socket. 
Witnesses later described the attack as ‘vicious’, ‘the worst that they had ever witnessed’, 
and ‘quite horrific’. M tried to escape while witnesses called the police. When they arrived 
and instructed T to desist he expressed surprise saying “why are you arresting me he’s the 
terrorist”. He initially resisted arrest and tried to flee the scene but was arrested soon 
afterwards. 
 
T was charged with attempted murder and appeared before HHJ Dodgson and a jury at 
Kingston-upon-Thames Crown Court in October 2016. He pleaded not guilty on the basis of 
self-defence and defence of others in that he had genuinely believed that M was a terrorist. 
However, HHJ Dodgson ruled that the defence was unavailable to T because of s.76 of the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (the 2008 Act). This provides at s.76(4) that an 
accused (D) is entitled to plead either self-defence and/or defence or another, based on their 
genuine belief as to the facts, including a mistaken belief, whether or not that belief was 
reasonably held. However, s.76(5) then provides that ‘subsection (4)(b) does not enable D to 
rely on any mistaken belief attributable to intoxication that was voluntarily induced’ 
(emphasis added). 
 
Evidence presented to the Crown Court revealed that T had a long-standing problem with 
alcohol and drug use and that his consumption of intoxicating substances had brought on 
‘feelings of paranoia’. These feelings could come ‘in the form of voices, and feelings of 
aggression and vulnerability, as if he were under threat’ (at [16]). He admitted to the jury that 
in the weeks leading up to the incident he had been habitually drinking to excess and had 
used cocaine. Starting on the evening of Friday 29 January 2016 and continuing into the 
early hours of the following morning, he had consumed a large amount of alcohol. He had 
also consumed more alcohol on the evening of Saturday 30 January. i.e. the evening before 
his attack on M, although there was no evidence to suggest that he was intoxicated on the 
Sunday afternoon. T accepted that he was feeling paranoid on that afternoon when he 
attacked M. 
 
HHJ Dodgson ruled that T’s genuine, albeit mistaken, belief that M was somehow involved in 
terrorist activities was excluded by s. 76(5) on the bass that it was a ‘mistaken belief 
attributable to intoxication that was voluntarily induced’. He reached that conclusion after 
consulting the Oxford English Dictionary which defined intoxication as: ‘The action of 
rendering stupid, insensible, or disordered in intellect, with a drug or alcoholic liquor’. The 
trial judge ruled that T was ‘disordered in intellect’ at the time of the attack and this condition 
was ‘attributable’ to his earlier voluntary intoxication. HHJ Dodgson left to the jury the 
question of whether T acted with the requisite mens rea of attempted murder (intention to 
kill). The jury unanimously convicted. T appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that HHJ 
Dodgson has misinterpreted s.76(5). T contended that the phrase ‘attributable to intoxication’ 
should be taken to only refer to the present state, i.e. where someone was actually 
intoxicated at the time when they formed the mistaken belief. 
 
HELD, dismissing the appeal, that the words ‘attributable to intoxication’ in s. 76(5) of the 
2008 Act were 
 
‘broad enough to encompass both (a) a mistaken state of mind as a result of 
being drunk or intoxicated at the time and (b) a mistaken state of mind 
immediately and proximately consequent upon earlier drink or drug-taking, so 
that even though the person concerned is not drunk or intoxicated at the time, 
the short-term effects can be shown to have triggered subsequent episodes of 
e.g. paranoia’ (at [60]).  
 
Brian Leveson P, giving the unanimous decision of a five-judge Court of Appeal, said that 
there was therefore no misdirection: ‘In the circumstances, we agree with Judge Dodgson, 
that the phrase “attributable to intoxication” is not confined to cases in which alcohol or drugs 
are still present in a defendant’s system’ (at [60]). 
 
Alternatively, even if that interpretation of the 2008 Act was wrong, the trial judge was 
nevertheless correct to withdraw self-defence from the jury because T’s belief as to the facts 
was unreasonable. Reliance was placed on a passage from Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725, 
[2014] 1 Cr App R 11, in which Davis LJ said that ‘An insane person cannot set the 
standards of reasonableness as to the degree of force used by reference to his own insanity’ 
(at [47]). Although the two cases were distinguishable in that, whilst the accused in Oye was 
found not guilty by reason of insanity, whereas there was no suggestion that T’s mental 
condition satisfied the M’Naghten test for insanity, Leveson P said that Davis LJ’s 
‘observation is equally apposite in this case. Any objective consideration of the facts 
revealed no reasonable basis for the response of Taj… There is no basis upon which the 




‘Attributable to intoxication’ in s. 76(5) of the 2008 Act 
The present case is primarily one of statutory interpretation: what does ‘attributable to 
intoxication’ mean? The Court of Appeal had a choice of two meanings, a broad view 
advocated by the Crown and a narrow view contended for by the appellant. In the event the 
Court preferred the Crown’s broader view. Reliance was placed on the Oxford English 
Dictionary definition of ‘attributable’, i.e. ‘ascribe to; regard as the effect of a stated cause’. 
 
In previous cases involving the combination of self-defence and intoxication – cases arising 
before the 2008 Act – the courts had only been required to deal with the situation where the 
accused’s belief in the need to use defensive force arose because he was, at that time, 
under the influence of an intoxicating substance or substances. The best-known cases are 
O’Grady [1987] QB 995 and Hatton [2005] EWCA Crim 2951, [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 16, both 
of which involved the accused inflicting fatal injuries on the victim in the mistaken belief that 
the victim was attacking the accused; moreover, in both cases the accused was intoxicated 
at the time. In both cases the Court of Appeal held that in such circumstances a mistaken 
belief in the need to use force could not be relied upon. The appellant’s contention in the 
present case therefore involved an argument that s.76(5) should only apply in cases such as 
O’Grady and Hatton. 
 
Hence, when the Court of Appeal in the present case ruled that s. 76(5) also applies to a 
mistaken belief ‘attributable to’ in the sense of ‘ascribed to’ or ‘caused by’ the longer-term 
effects of voluntary intoxication it went beyond the common law precedents. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court relied on various policy statements set out by the House of Lords in 
DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443. That case did not involve self-defence but rather the 
question whether or not evidence of a state of self-induced intoxication could be used to 
deny proof of recklessness. The answer to that question (‘no’) had no bearing on the Court 
of Appeal in the present case; however, various statements from their Lordships’ speeches 
in Majewski lent support to the general proposition that voluntary intoxication – as a matter of 
public policy – could not be deployed to provide an accused, especially one accused of a 
violent crime, with a defence (except where the evidence of intoxication prevented proof of a 
specific intent). 
 
These passages are very well-known and there is no need to repeat them here (although the 
Court of Appeal in the present case does so at [55]). In the light of those passages, it was 
probably to be expected that the Court of Appeal in the present case would not find 
sympathy with the appellant’s contention. The Court of Appeal was well aware of the fact 
that the situation in Majewski (as in O’Grady and Hatton) involved an accused who was 
intoxicated at the time of the offending, whereas T in the present case was (apparently) 
sober at the time of the assault on M. Nevertheless, as Leveson P said, ‘it is difficult to see 
why the language (and the policy identified) is not equally apposite to the immediate and 
proximate consequences of such misuse… We see that as an application of Majewski, 
rather than an extension of that decision or, at the highest, a most incremental extension’ (at 
[57]). 
 
The Court of Appeal was careful to point out that the decision in the present case did not 
affect the rule that where an accused’s long-term alcohol and/or drug consumption has 
brought about a state of mind that satisfies the M’Naghten rules, then he or she can plead 
the insanity defence. That rule dates from Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563. It was confirmed by 
the House of Lords in DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479 (‘drunkenness is one thing and the 
diseases to which drunkenness leads are different things’, per Lord Birkenhead at p 500) 
and applied most recently by the Court of Appeal in Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223 (‘insanity 
which is temporary is as much insanity as that which is long-lasting or permanent. Davis was 
a case of a defendant suffering (temporarily) from delirium tremens. That, self-evidently, is 
not intoxication. It is, if anything, the opposite’, per Hughes LJ at [15]). 
 
‘Reasonable force in the circumstances’ 
The alternative basis for upholding T’s conviction was the ruling that T had used 
unreasonable force. On this point, s.76(3) of the 2008 Act provides that ‘the question 
whether the degree of force used by D was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided 
by reference to the circumstances as D believed them to be’. Section 76(4) adds that D is 
entitled to be judged on his or her genuine (and not necessarily reasonable) belief as to the 
facts, whether mistaken or not. Section 76(5) then explicitly precludes reliance on mistaken 
beliefs attributable to intoxication (as discussed above). However, the 2008 Act makes no 
reference to mistaken beliefs attributable to psychosis, paranoia or any other psychiatric 
condition or disorder. Does that mean that the jury should have been directed to take T’s 
paranoia into account when determining whether his belief that M (an electrician) was in fact 
a terrorist? The answer is ‘no’… not because of the 2008 Act, but because the point of law 
has already been decided at common law. Hence, evidence of T’s paranoia was irrelevant 
when determining his belief as to the circumstances. 
 
The Court of Appeal in the present case placed reliance on the ruling in Oye, which was 
itself based on two earlier Court of Appeal rulings, Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245; [2003] 
QB 1 and Canns [2005] EWCA Crim 2264. In Martin, Lord Woolf CJ said that ‘we would not 
agree that it is appropriate, except in exceptional circumstances which would make the 
evidence especially probative, in deciding whether excessive force has been used to take 
into account whether the defendant is suffering from some psychiatric condition’ (at [67]; 
emphasis added). Presumably, given the dismissal of T’s appeal, there was no ‘especially 
probative’ evidence of psychiatric disorder in the present case.  
 
Section 76 is a curious piece of legislation in that it incorporates some – but by no means all 
– of the common law principles underpinning self-defence into legislation. Thus, s.76(4) is 
based on the decision in Williams (1984) 78 Cr. App. R. 276; s.76(5) has its origins in the 
O’Grady and Hatton cases (as discussed above). The fact that there is no ‘duty to retreat’, 
although any ‘possibility that D could have retreated is to be considered (so far as relevant) 
as a factor to be taken into account’, now found in s.76(6A) of the 2008 Act, can be traced 
back to the judgment of Lord Lane CJ in Bird [1985] 1 WLR 816 at p.821. 
 
The proposition in s.76(7)(a), that ‘a person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be able 
to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary action’, can be found almost 
verbatim in the judgment of Lord Morris in Palmer [1971] AC 814 at p.832. Likewise the 
proposition in s.76(7)(b), that ‘evidence of a person's having only done what the person 
honestly and instinctively thought was necessary for a legitimate purpose constitutes strong 
evidence that only reasonable action was taken by that person for that purpose’ – Lord 
Morris in Palmer again (with some minor tweaking). 
 
However, the 2008 Act is conspicuously silent about the effect of D’s psychiatric conditions 
or disorder (if any) on his or her beliefs as to the circumstances. If / when Parliament revisits 
section 76 (something it has done twice already, with amendments by s.148 of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and by s.43 of the Crime and Courts Act 
2013) it might care to address this point. In a case note discussing Oye in this journal (‘Self-
Defence: Insane Delusions and Reasonable Force’ (2014) 78(1) J. Crim. L. 12), this author 
suggested that a further amendment along the following lines (based on Lord Woolf’s 
judgment in Martin) might not be inappropriate: 
 
‘Subsection (4)(b) does not enable D to rely on any mistaken belief induced by 
psychosis or any other psychiatric disorder, unless there are exceptional 
circumstances which would make the evidence especially probative.’ 
 
